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Abstract
Many political decisions are taken in legislatures or committees and are subject to lobby-
ing efforts. A seminal contribution to the vote-buying literature is the legislative lobbying
model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will op-
timally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of
this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model
assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simul-
taneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory and
supporting evidence for the comparative statics predictions with respect to lobbies’ bud-
gets and legislators’ preferences. Some comparative statics effects also carry over to the
simultaneous move set-up but the predictive power of the model is much weaker.
Keywords: legislative lobbying, vote buying, Colonel Blotto, multi-battlefield contests,
experimental public choice.
JEL: C92, D72.
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1 Introduction
Special interest groups frequently try to influence political decisions, e.g. with large donations
to political campaigns, and it is easy to find recent examples. According to the Center for
Responsive Politics, lobbyists working on tax related issues donated USD 9.6 million to members
of the U.S. Congress in the first three quarters of 2017.1 It is difficult to tell how such donations
and other favors influence political decisions as the interaction of special interest groups and
policy-makers is complex and to a large extent obscure. There are several theoretical approaches
to analyze the lobbying process in legislatures, which necessarily abstract from reality to a large
extent. A major obstacle for researchers is the difficulty to test these theories empirically due
to the opacity of the process. As a consequence, it remains difficult to judge how realistically
the specific models reflect the lobbying process and how strongly real behavior and outcomes
differ from the model’s predictions.
In this paper, we try to shed some light on these questions by implementing the structure
of a prominent workhorse model in the lobbying literature in a controlled lab experiment.
Specifically, we test the predictions of the legislative lobbying model, pioneered by Groseclose
and Snyder (1996), henceforth GS, in which two opposed lobbies move once and sequentially.
Among the central predictions of the GS model are that it is often cheaper for lobbies to bribe
supermajorities rather than simple majorities and that they should leave no soft spots to the
opposed lobby by making payments so that all lobbied legislators are equally expensive to buy
out of the coalition. Based on examples given in the original GS paper, we design several
scenarios with seven legislators predicting different sizes of lobbied supermajorities and varying
distributions of bribe offers to test the explanatory power of the theoretical model.
Even if the theoretical predictions were confirmed in this experiment, one of the obstacles
to claim external validity and at the same time one of the main criticism of the GS model is
the sequential game structure. Therefore in a next step, we relax the sequentiality assumption
and run treatments in which lobbies move simultaneously.
1We note that the Republican tax reform passed Congress in the fourth. See
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/12/tax-lobbyists-contributions for more details. Details on many
more cases, almost exclusively based on data provided by the U.S. government, are presented on OpenSe-
crets.org, the Center for Responsive Politics’ website.
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In the simultanous move game the case with seven legislators is very complex. While no
analytical predictions are available, we argue that the underlying economic logic suggests that
we should observe similar comparative static results between the scenarios as in the sequential
case. To see whether the model predictions become more accurate when complexity is reduced,
we also run treatments with only three legislators. While the computation of all equilibria is
unfeasible with normal computing power for the seven legislator case with simultaneous moves,
we are able to determine all equilibria of the simplified set-up. In fact, for one scenario we
obtain the daunting number of 108 different (mixed-strategy) equilibria. However, they share
some common properties, which allow for comparative statics predictions regarding the number
of bribes offered and the sum of bribes offered between scenarios. While it seems unlikely that
these equilibria will be identified by the subjects of the experiment, they might nevertheless
capture the economic intuition of the game and it will be useful to compare their predictive
performance with the GS predictions for the sequential moves case.
The experimental results confirm the key comparative predictions of the GS model for the
sequential moves scenarios but point predictions regarding the number and level of bribes are
not very precise. The explanatory power of the predictions derived in the sequential move set-up
declines for the simultaneous moves treatments but many comparative statics predictions are
nevertheless robust to the relaxation of this central model assumption. The simplified scenarios
confirm this pattern and the equilibrium analysis provides some additional cues as to the limits
of the predictive power of the GS model for simultaneous moves scenarios.
Relation to the literature There are several different approaches to capture lobbying in the
form of vote buying theoretically.2 In the common agency approach several principals (lobbies)
make offer schedules to an agent (politician) specifying for any possible policy choice how many
resources they pay if it was implemented. The model has been introduced by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) and it has often been applied since, e.g. famously for analyzing the role of
special interest groups in the shaping of trade policies (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 2001).
Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) test some of the model’s key predictions in the lab.
2For brevity we omit a discussion of other forms of lobbying, such as informational lobbying (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982) and lobbying in the form of legislative subsidies (Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Ellis and Groll, 2017).
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While the common agency approach offers explanations of lobbying of a single policy-maker,
our interest in this paper is on lobbying of legislatures or committees. We focus on the seminal
legislative lobbing model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996). In the original set-up,
lobbies move sequentially in making offers to the legislators in favor of their preferred policy
choice, which is either an exogenously given policy change or the status quo. As one of the
landmarks in the lobbying literature it has triggered interesting variations and extensions (e.g.
Diermeier and Myerson, 1999; Banks, 2000; Dekel et al., 2008, 2009; Hummel, 2009; Le Breton
and Zaporozhets, 2010; Schneider, 2014, 2017) but surprisingly has not been tested empirically
in the laboratory. This is the focus of the present paper. In addition to testing the model’s
key predictions, we conduct a stress-test (as defined in Morton and Williams 2010) by relaxing
the central assumption of sequential and publicly visible moves of the two lobbies. These
somewhat arbitrary assumptions have been a point for criticism of the sequential legislative
lobbing model (e.g. in Grossman and Helpman, 2001). Assuming simultaneous moves instead
- an equally arbitrary assumption, proponents of the legislative lobbying model might argue -
transforms the game into a Colonel Blotto type of game. This class of games has been studied
in another strand of the literature.
The models proposed there assume simultaneous moves. A contest success function deter-
mines who wins the vote of a legislator in a legislature deciding on an exogenously given policy
proposal. Variations of this approach range from assuming Tullock success functions to different
types of auctions (e.g. Szentes and Rosenthal, 2003a,b; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009; Kovenock
and Roberson, 2012). The use of all-pay auctions has been very prevalent in the theoretical
literature, in particular in the form of the classical ”Colonel Blotto game”, first analyzed by
Borel (1921), where the lobby making the highest payments wins the legislator’s vote. The
theoretical solutions to this game are notoriously complicated (Roberson, 2006; Roberson and
Kvasov, 2012; Kvasov, 2007). Typically no pure-strategy equilibria exist in this class of games
with the exception of some special cases, e.g. with asymmetric battlefield valuations (Hortala-
Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2012).3 Various versions of all-pay auction lobbying games have
3See Casella et al. (2017) for a recent application of a Blotto type of game on decision-making in committees
with storable votes.
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been studied in the laboratory (e.g. Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; Chowdhury and Kovenock,
2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015; Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2015; Montero et al., 2016;
Mago and Sheremeta, 2017).
The simultaneuos version of the model in our paper differs from the previously studied
games in that it is not an all-pay auction. Lobbies make bribe offers that only have to be paid
if the legislator votes accordingly, that is if the battlefield is won. While there is no general
theoretical solution of this particular game, we are able to present results for some specific
settings that we implement in the lab. The experiment provides a first idea of how different the
results between the simultaneous and sequential model variants are. It is of general interest how
subjects play complex simultaneous move games. Colman et al. (2014) suggests that subjects
might use a heuristic called “Strong Stackelberg Reasoning”, according to which subjects play
simultaneous games as if they were sequential. If subjects followed this heuristic, we would
not find any differences between the sequential and the simultaneous set-up with respect to
behavior of the lobby that moves first in the sequential set-up.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce sequential legislative
lobbying game and the theoretical reasoning behind its central equilibrium predictions. We
further discuss the same game with simultaneous moves and explain why some comparative
statics in the simultaneous move game may be similar to those in the sequential set-up. In
Section 2, we design the scenarios that we implement in the lab and describe the procedural
details of the experiment. We present and discuss our results in Section 3 and conclude in
Section 4. Experimental instructions and additional results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Background and Experimental Design
In this section, we first introduce the legislative lobbying model and its main theoretical pre-
dictions. We focus on the intuition behind the theoretical results that are important for our
experiment.4 Then we explain the scenarios that we implement in the lab.
4A detailed analysis can be found in e.g. Groseclose and Snyder (1996); Le Breton and Zaporozhets (2010);
Schneider (2014).
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2.1 Theoretical Mechanism
The model set-up considers two lobbies, A and B, that compete to win a majority in a legislature
of size N , which we assume to be an odd number for simplicity. Lobby A prefers a policy change
while lobby B supports the status quo. Legislators have preferences over the two policy options
expressed by a bias vi in favor of voting for the policy change and against the status quo. The
subscript i refers to legislator i. Hence, a positive value of vi expresses a preference in line with
that of lobby A, while a negative one is in line with the preferences of lobby B.
In the sequential game, Lobby A moves first offering a schedule of bribes {bAi } to the
legislators. Lobby B moves second with schedule {bBi } and bAi , bBi ≥ 0. Lobbies only pay their
offers if the legislator voted for their preferred alternative. As shown in Groseclose and Snyder
(1996), there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game with the following property:
Either the first mover succeeds in forming a majority coalition that preempts the second mover
from winning the vote and the first mover will consequently make the corresponding payments;
or the first mover has no possibility to keep the second mover from securing a majority for the
status quo and refrains from offering any payments at all. In the first case, the second mover
will not make any payments and in the latter case, the second mover will only compensate
the pro-change biases of a sufficient number of legislators for a simple majority to vote for the
status quo. In fact, in all scenarios that we implement in the lab, a majority of legislators have
a (slight) preference bias for the status quo. Consequently, the second mover will never make
any payments in equilibrium and only the first mover will form winning coalitions through
payments if feasible.
The following equilibrium properties provide the key predictions that we will test in the
laboratory: First, there are no equilibria where both lobbies make payments. Second, when
making payments the first-mover lobby will use a leveling strategy, where every bribed legislator
will be equally expensive to buy back for the second mover. The intuition for the optimality of a
leveling strategy is that it leaves no ”soft spots”. To see this, suppose that some legislators can
be bought back by the second mover at a lower expense than others. Requiring only a simple
majority for the status quo to destroy the coalition for a policy change, the most expensive
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legislators will not be offered any payments but the second mover will concentrate his offers on
the cheapest set of legislators. In this case, however, it is optimal for the first mover to reduce
the offers to the most expensive legislators to increase the offers to the least expensive ones.
This logic applies as long as the legislators differ in costs to be secured for a vote in its favor
by the second mover.
The third central prediction is that the optimal sizes of the majorities (weakly) decrease
with the legislators’ biases in favour of the status quo, vi, and (weakly) increase with the prize
for B. The central insight advanced by Groseclose and Snyder (1996) is that it is often cheaper
to form a supermajority than a simple majority. The key intuition behind it is that the amount
necessary for the second mover to destroy a majority formed by the first mover must exceed the
second mover’s budget. In case of a simple majority, the second mover needs to buy back only
one legislator. That is, for each legislator in the first-mover’s coalition, the first mover’s offer bi
minus the legislator’s initial bias for the status quo vi must be larger than the second mover’s
budget. If the first mover increased the majority by another legislator, the second mover needs
to buy back two legislators to break the coalition for a policy change. Consequently, for any
two legislators the cost must exceed the second mover’s budget. This allows the first mover to
reduce the offers made to each single legislator, thereby saving resources as long as the initial
status quo bias of the additional legislator in the coalition is sufficiently small. The trade-off
when including another legislator in the coalition is between the resources that can be saved by
being able to reduce the bribe offers to all other legislators in the coalition and the extra amount
to be paid to neutralize this legislator’s initial bias in favour of the status quo. Accordingly, if
the legislators do not have any preferential bias towards the status quo, it will be optimal to
form a coalition including all legislators. Further, for given preference biases of the legislators,
the larger the prize for B is, the larger will the reduction in the offers to the legislators in the
coalition be, when the majority is increased by an additional legislator. Hence, ceteris paribus,
the larger B’s budget is the (weakly) larger the size of lobby A’s majority will be. It follows
from this intuition that, ceteris paribus, the size of the supermajority formed by the first-mover
will be the larger the smaller the legislators biases in favor of the status quo and the larger the
second mover’s budget.
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Fourth, as there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the sequential legislative lobbying
game, either lobby A or lobby B will win the vote for sure.
We test these predictions in the lab in several scenarios varying the degrees of the status-quo
biases of the legislators and the second mover’s prize which reflects their maximal willingness to
pay to break a pro-change majority by the first-mover lobby. We describe the specific scenarios
with their particular predictions in the next section.
One of the specific criticisms of the sequential legislative lobbying model is the sequential
timing of the lobbies’ moves. The direct way of assessing how important the sequential moves
are in this set-up is to compare the outcomes with those in the exact same game but with
simultaneous moves. Models of this type are often referred to as ”Colonel Blotto games” which
are notoriously difficult to solve analytically. There cannot be any pure strategy equilibria for
the following reason: In any combination of two pure strategies by lobbies A and B, if one of
the lobbies wins there will be a possibility to deviate to win at lower costs given the strategy
of the other lobby (e.g. make an offer to legislators that the other lobby did not make an offer
to) or there is a possibility for the other lobby to win the majority given its opponent’s offer
schedule. While several variants of these ”Colonel Blotto games” have been solved resulting
in very complicated mixed strategies equilibria, there is no general solution in the literature
for our simultaneous move set-up due to two particular properties: (1) it is not an all-pay
auction: offers do not have to be paid if the legislator does not vote accordingly. (2) The
lobbies’ objectives are to win the majority of votes, while the Colonel Blotto game has been
solved for lobbies which try to maximize the number of voters voting for their cause (not caring
about whether they will win a majority).
Consequently, the only way to obtain theoretical predictions for our experiment is to derive
the equilibria for the particular scenarios that we bring into the laboratory. For the standard
legislative lobbying game as depicted earlier, this is possible for the simplest possible set-up with
three legislators and very low willingness to pay of the lobby defending the status quo. Even in
this simplest set-up, we obtain a large number of equilibria that can be summarized in several
equilibrium types. It is not possible to derive equilibrium predictions in more complicated set-
ups with more than three legislators or higher willingness to pay for the status quo with normal
8
computing power.5 While any such set-up can, in principle, be solved with supercomputers,
the experimental subjects certainly cannot and have to rely on some sort of intuitive reasoning.
However, it might be interesting to see if the intuitions outlined below also show up in the
equilibria for the simple scenarios and if they add explanatory power in the data analysis. For
this reason, we bring two different set-ups each with sequential and simultaneous moves into the
laboratory: one with seven and one with three legislators. The scenarios with seven legislators
allow us to directly connect to the examples given in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) and test how
different the outcomes will be if the game is played with simultaneous moves. For the scenarios
with three legislators set-up, we can derive theoretical predictions for both the sequential and
simultaneous move game.
The following intuition suggests that a similar logic regarding supermajorities as in the
sequential game holds in the simultaneous move game as well. In principle, there are two
strategy types for winning a majority: (a) Offering a large number of legislators a small amount
on top of neutralizing the legislators’ preference biases and (b) offering a smaller number of
legislators a substantial amount extra to preference bias neutralisation. Strategy (a) tries to win
a majority by winning over those legislators that the opposed lobby B did not make any offers or
offered very little. Overall, the probability of winning the vote of any particular legislator might
not be very high but the probability of winning sufficient legislators for a majority is substantial.
Strategy (b) seeks to achieve a high probability of winning almost all of the legislators in a
small coalition. The mixed strategies of the lobbies in the simultaneous game are probability
distributions over the support comprising strategies of type (a) and type (b) as well as hybrid
versions of the two. If the preference of the legislators is biased more strongly against the policy
change, lobby A needs to pay more for neutralizing the preference bias for all legislators in its
coalition. This makes strategies of type (a) more costly and we expect that this will reduce
the probability weight on such pure strategies in the mixed strategy played in equilibrium.
Consequently, as in the sequential game, we predict that the expected size of the majorities
formed by lobby A will be smaller if the legislators preference biases against the policy change
5For example, with seven legislators and a willingness to pay of lobby A of 9, there are roughly 107 (not
weakly dominated) pure strategies for lobby A. The pay-off matrix would be extremely large (many terabytes).
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are larger. On the contrary, if the prize of winning the vote for lobby B increases, securing
almost all legislators’s votes in a small coalition will become substantially more expensive for
A leading to a reduction in probability weight on strategy types (b). Hence we expect larger
expected majority sizes for A if B’s budget is larger.
In summary the depicted intuition suggests that the same comparative static results with
respect to lobby B’s budget and legislators’ initial biases as in the sequential game can be
found in the simultaneous game set-up.6 However, despite similar comparative statics results
we expect higher variation in offer schedules in the simultaneous move game relative to the
sequential move set-up due to the equilibria being in mixed strategies.
Moreover, while in the sequential game lobbies either win or lose the vote for sure, the
simultaneous game allows lobby A to trade-off to slightly reduce the probability of winning to
reduce the expected amount of bribes to be paid. Hence we expect that the winning probability
of A will be lower in the simultaneous game than in the sequential legislative lobbying game.
Another reason why the results in the simultaneous move game may be similar to the results
in the sequential game could be that in complex games individuals apply a simple heuristic
called “Strong Stackelberg Reasoning”, proposed by Colman et al. (2014). It suggests that
subjects play simultaneous games as if they were sequential. If subjects followed this heuristic,
we should not find any differences between the sequential and the simultaneous set-up with
respect to behavior of the lobby that moves first in the sequential set-up.
2.2 Lab Scenarios
In the experiment we implement seven scenarios for the game with seven legislators and two
scenarios with three legislators.
In the first five scenarios with seven legislators, all legislators are identical and between
scenarios we vary their preference bias towards the status quo as well as lobby B’s budget. In
the last two scenarios with seven legislators, we slightly increase the complexity by considering
differences in the preferences of the legislators and vary the budget of the status quo defending
6For the 3 legislator scenarios, we show that the theoretical comparative statics results for the simultaneous
set-up are indeed the same as those for the sequential set-up (see subsection 2.2.2).
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lobby between the two scenarios.
For the set-up with three legislators we consider two scenarios with homogeneous legislators
with different status-quo biases between the two specifications. As indicated previously, our
focus here is on testing the theoretical predictions that we have for both the simultaneous and
the sequential games.
2.2.1 Legislature with seven Legislators
In all scenarios, Lobby A possesses a maximal willingness to pay of 300 to win the vote in favor
of policy change. Lobby B’s willingness to pay to win the vote to preserve the status quo differs
across the scenarios between 12, 60, and 180. Moreover, the scenarios show different biases of
the legisators. In the sequential games, lobby A always moves first, and the defender of the
status quo, B, moves second. The budgets are 400 for lobby A and 200 for lobby B.
Scenarios with homogeneous legislator preferences We consider legislators to be either
unbiased, more precisely they have a minimal bias of 0.5 in favor of the status quo as a tie
break if no payments are made, or have a strong status quo bias of 19.5. Lobby B’s valuation
for preserving the status quo varies between a relatively weak 12, a strong preference of 60, and
a very strong preference of 180. The particular scenarios with their equilibrium predictions in
the sequential move game are summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Theoretical predictions 7 legislators
Sc1 Sc2 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6 Sc7
Prize B 12 12 60 60 180 12 60
Legisl. valuation
Legisl. 1-3 - 0.5 -19.5 -0.5 -19.5 -19.5 12.5 12.5
Legisl. 4-7 - 0.5 -19.5 -0.5 -19.5 -19.5 -19.5 -19.5
Equil predictions
Coalition size A 7 4 7 6 0 4 6
Levelling [%] 100 100 100 100 0 100 100
Total bribes A 25 128 109 238 0 32 142
Total bribes B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The idea behind scenarios one to four is to test our hypotheses regarding the predictions on
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changes in the prize for lobby B and in the legislators’ evaluations. In particular, comparing the
results between scenarios one and two and between scenarios three and four indicates the effects
of differences in the legislators’ preference biases towards the status quo. With higher biases
the majority is predicted to decline. The majority size declines less if the value of the status
quo for lobby B is higher as the latter makes a larger majority more beneficial as explained in
Section 2.1.
Comparing the results between scenarios one and three and between scenarios two and four
reveals whether the hypothesis that majority sizes (weakly) increase with higher prizes for
the status quo defender. As pointed out previously, with neutral bias of the legislators it is
always optimal to form a maximal coalition including the entire legislature. However, there are
substantial costs of large majorities when the legislators have strong status quo biases. In this
case, a large coalition is only optimal for the pro-change lobby if the defender of the status quo
has a high willingness to pay thereby increasing the benefits of a large supermajority.
In scenario five, we test the case where the willingness to pay by lobby B is so large that
there is no profitable way for lobby A to preempt lobby B from buying back a sufficient number
of legislators to preserve the status quo.
The theory predicts leveling in all cases (except scenario 5), which in the scenarios with
homogeneous legislator valuations theoretically implies that all legislators in the coalition obtain
the same offer. As we only allow offers in integers in the experimental scenarios and impose
valuations of a half to break ties, the least expensive way to form a majority coalition for lobby
A is to pay one unit less to one legislator less the number of legislators in the coalition that the
second mover needs to buy back to destroy the majority pro policy change. As a consequence
of the indivisibility implied by integer offers, leveling in the scenarios we implement in the lab
can thus include differences of one between the offers.
Different valuations by legislators We also test the situation where the legislators have
different valuations. Three legislators have valuation 12.5 in favor of policy change and four
voters have −19.5. Prize of winning for B varies again between 12 and 60. In the case, where
Lobby B’s willingness to pay is only 12, Lobby A in forming a winning coalition does not
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have to worry about B offering bribes to any of the three legislators with 12.5 valuation of
policy change. Consequently, lobby A will concentrate their offers on the legislators biased
towards the status quo to form a coalition pro policy change that includes legislators with and
without bribe offers. This is referred to as a non-flooded coalition. In the second case, where
B’s willingness to pay is 60 for the status quo, it is necessary to make an offer to a legislator
with initial preference bias of 12.5 pro policy change. As a consequence of the ”leaving no soft
spots” logic, lobby A will have to make additional offers to the pro-change legislators as well as
to a number of legislators initially leaning towards the status quo. All legislators in the formed
coalition will receive payments: a flooded coalition.
Scenarios 6 and 7 have been set-up to test whether paricipants form a non-flooded coalition
and a flooded coalition respectively. In scenario 6, it is optimal for lobby A to form a non-
flooded coalition of four where only one pro status-quo legislator with valuation −19.5 receives
a bribe of 32. In scenario 7, it is optimal for A to form a flooded coalition with six legislators.
To make all legislators in the coalition equally costly to buy back, lobby A offers all pro-change
legislators a payment of 8 and among the other three status-quo leaning legislators it offers
39 to two of them and 40 to one. Recall that the latter is due to us allowing only integers as
payment offers. The minimal total cost for this flooded coalition will be 142.
2.2.2 Legislature with three Legislators
Both lobbies possess a budget of 30. The maximal willingness to pay for policy change by
lobby A is 25 and the maximal willingness to pay by lobby B to defend the status quo is 2.
Legislators are homogeneous and we again implement a scenario (scenario 1) where legislators
are unbiased (valuation of −0.5 for tie-break without payments) and one where they relatively
strongly lean towards the status quo −4.5 (scenario 2).
In the sequential game, where lobby A moves first, it is least expensive to buy a super-
majority comprising all three voters and spend 2 on two legislators and offer 1 to the third,
summing up to a total cost of 5. In the second scenario, the costs of a vote pro policy change
is more expensive, leading to an optimal majority of two legislators formed by paying both 7.
This adds up to a minimum total cost of 14.
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Table 2: Theoretical predictions 3 legislators
Sc1 Sc2
Legisl. valuation - 0.5 -4.5
Equil types:
sequential 1 1
simultaneous 4 12
Coalition size A:
Equil: sequential 3 2
Equil: simultaneous 2.25 2
Levelling by A:
Equil: sequential 100 100
Equil: simultaneous 100 0 – 100
(dep. equil type)
Total bribes proposed by A:
Equil: sequential 5 14
Equil: simultaneous 2.25 11
In Table 2 we contrast the preditions of the sequential move game with those in the correspond-
ing simultaneous move game.7 While we obtain 16 equilibria for scenario 1 and for the second
scenario 108 equilibria, they can be summarized to a much smaller number of equilibrium
types. Equilibrium types comprise all equilibria where strategies only differ in permutations of
payments between different legislators.
In scenario 1 in all four equilibrium types, pro change lobby A randomizes between a grand
coalition of paying each legislator an amount of 1, or forming simple majorities by offering a
payment of 1 to any two legislators. Each of the four possibilities carries equal probability
weight of 0.25. Consequently we expect a supermajority in a fourth of cases and in three
quarters of cases a simple majority. This implies that on average coalition sizes formed by A
should be 2.25 and the expected costs amount to 2.25 as well. Compared to the sequential
set-up, this makes it substantially cheaper for lobby A to effect policy change, which reflects
the second mover advantage of the defender of the status quo in the sequential set-up as well
as the fact that it is optimal for the pro-change lobby to give up a 100% probability of winning
7We used the software GAMBIT 14 to solve the simultaneous games. Documention can be found in McKelvey
et al. (2016) and under http://www.gambit-project.org/. We provide the details on all the different equilibria
to the interested reader upon request.
14
the vote. The different strategies by lobby B define four equilibrium types. However, they
look very similar: All place a large probability of about 95% on not making any offers, while
the 6 strategies where either one or two legislators are offered an amount of 1 carry almost
equal shares of the remaining 5% probability. Consequently, we expect on average close to zero
payments by lobby B.
In scenario 2, we find 12 equilibrium types. All equilibria have in common that the pro-
change lobby A will form a minimal coalition of two legislators and involves expected total
costs of 11.
These are clear predictions that we will test in the experiment. Between the two scenarios
in the simultaneous game, the average coalition size should be larger in scenario 1 compared
to scenario 2 and the amount spent to win the majority should be higher. Relative to the
sequential game, we expect to find smaller coalition sizes, less payments offered in total, and a
lower probability of winning the vote for lobby A in the simultaneous game.
2.3 Procedural Details
A total of 162 students of ETH Zurich and the University of Zurich (58% female, average age
23y) participated in 10 experimental sessions.8
Table 3: Number of Sessions and Participants
7 legislators 3 legislators
Seq Sim Seq Sim
Sessions 3 3 2 2
Subjects 82 80 56 56
Notes: A session lasted on average 110 minutes and aver-
age earnings were CHF 52.
Participants played one round of each of the seven scenarios in the 7 legislator sessions. Before
that they played three practice rounds. The sequence of scenarios was varied randomly between
sessions but for each session with a specific sequence in the sequential moves treatment, we
8The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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also ran one with the same sequence in the simultaneous moves treatment. In the 3 legislator
sessions, subjects played 5 rounds of each of the two scenarios in a row after two practice rounds.
One of the two sessions in the two subtreatments (sequential and simultaneous) started with
scenario 1, the other one with scenario 2. In all treatments, subjects were randomly re-matched
after every round and the roles of lobby A and lobby B were also randomly selected within
each pair of matched subjects in every round. As our focus is on the behavior of the lobbies,
we choose to hardwire the legislators in the following way: Each computerized legislator is
programmed to vote for the alternative that gives it the highest payoff. Subjects were informed
about all these details in the instructions (see Appendix B).
3 Experimental Results
3.1 Seven Legislators
3.1.1 Number and Level of Bribes
Sequential Moves Starting with scenarios 1-5, we observe that the comparative static results
hold between all scenarios but that the point predictions are not very accurate and significantly
different in all five (see Figure 1).9 However, regarding the distribution of number of bribes,
the mode corresponds to the theoretical prediction in all five scenarios. Regressing the actual
number of bribes offered on the theoretically predicted number, reveals that the theoretically
predicted values have a strongly significantly positive coefficient and explain 42% of the vari-
ation across scenarios 1-5 (Table 6, Appendix A).10 While the total sum of bribes offered is
significantly different from the point predictions (Table 4), regressing the former on the latter,
indicates that the theoretically predicted values have a strongly significantly positive coefficient
and explain 21% of the variation in the bribe levels across scenarios 1-5 (Table 7, Appendix A).
Turning to scenarios 6 and 7 (Figure 2 and Table 4), we find similar results as for scenarios 1-
5. While the point predictions do not hold, the comparative statics predictions are confirmed.
9In scenarios 6-7, legislators’ valuations are not homogeneous and predictions are qualitatively different. We
therefore analyze these scenarios separately. However, we also present the regression results of all scenarios
combined in Appendix A.
10When we speak of (strong) statistical significance throughout the text, we mean significance at the 5% (1%)
level in two-sided t-tests or F-tests with standard errors clustered at the subject level.
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Regressing the actual number of bribes offered and the total sum of bribes offered on the
theoretically predicted values we find that the latter are strongly significant predictors of the
observed behavior in the lab and explain 35% of the variation in both regressions (Tables 6 and
7, Appendix A).
Lobby A does not always win when it should (see Table 1). In scenarios 4 and 7, where
winning is most costly, it wins in only 49% of the cases. In the other scenarios lobby A wins
substantially more often. To a large extent the low winning rates are due to suboptimal behvior
of lobby A. However, in some cases lobby B wins by paying more than its willingness to pay.
This occurs in 17% of all cases in which B cannot win without making a loss. In scenario 5
where A is predicted to lose, it indeed always loses.
Simultaneous Moves Starting again with scenarios 1-5, we observe a similar pattern re-
garding the comparative statics, however the differences between treatments with respect to
the average number of bribes and the total bribe level are less pronounced than in the sequential
case. When we regress the actual number of bribes offered on the theoretically predicted num-
ber for the sequential case, we see that these values again have a strongly significantly positive
coefficient but explain only 10% of the variation across scenarios 1-5 (Table 6, Appendix A).
Regressing the total sum of bribes offered on the predicted values for the sequential case, reveals
that again the theoretically predicted values have a strongly significantly positive coefficient
but explains only 3% of the variation across scenarios 1-5 (Table 7, Appendix A). When we turn
to scenarios 6 and 7, we see no predictive power for the theoretically predicted values for the
sequential case for either the number of bribes offered or the total sum of bribes. In neither of
the two regressions the coefficients for the theoretically predicted values is significantly different
from zero and p-values are larger than 0.6 (Tables 6 and 7, Appendix A).
Interestingly, lobby A wins more often in all scenarios as compared to the sequential case.11
This is surprising as the predicted winning rates are 100% for all scenarios (except scenario 5,
where it is 0%) in the sequential moves case, while there are no equilibria with a winning rate
of 100% in the simultaneous case.
11The difference is strongly significant in scenarios 3, 4, 5 and 7, and if all scenarios are pooled.
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Figure 1: Number of Bribes in Scenarios 1-5
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Notes: The upper panel shows the means, their 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered at the subject level and the theoretical point predictions (as diamonds). The lower panel
displays the observed and theoretically predicted (in red) distributions.
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Figure 2: Number of Bribes in Scenarios 6 and 7
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Figure 2: Number of Bribes in Scenarios 6 and 7
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4.2 Three Legislators
Number and level of bribes ADD:
• Regressions of majority size on predicted majority size (according to GS) for Scen 1-2
• Discussion of bribe levels
Levelling ADD:
• Discussion of levelling
14
Notes: The upper panel shows the means, their 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at
the subject level and the theoretical point predictions (as diamonds). The lower panel displays the observed
and theoretically predicted (in red) distributions.
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Table 4: Results 7 legislators
S
c1
se
S
c2
se
S
c3
se
S
c4
se
S
c5
se
S
c6
se
S
c7
se
B
ri
be
s
p
ro
po
se
d
by
A
:
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
7
4
7
6
0
1
6
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
5.
59
(0
.1
8)
4.
88
(0
.1
4
)
6
.2
7
(0
.1
2
)
3
.7
6
(0
.3
4
)
0
.6
8
(0
.2
1
)
2
.4
9
(0
.2
1
)
5
.1
2
(0
.1
9
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
5.
9
(0
.1
5)
4.
9
(0
.1
6
)
5
.8
3
(0
.1
3
)
5
.0
3
(0
.1
6
)
4
.4
(0
.2
4
)
4
.6
(0
.1
9
)
4
.7
5
(0
.1
6
)
V
o
te
s
w
o
n
by
A
:
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
7
4
7
6
0
4
6
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
5.
2
(0
.2
)
4.
54
(0
.1
6
)
5
.3
4
(0
.2
)
3
.4
4
(0
.3
3
)
0
.3
7
(0
.1
1
)
4
.3
2
(0
.1
5
)
4
.4
9
(0
.2
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
5.
38
(0
.2
1)
4.
23
(0
.2
)
5
.1
(0
.1
8
)
4
.2
5
(0
.1
9
)
2
.8
8
(0
.2
4
)
4
.6
8
(0
.1
6
)
4
.6
(0
.1
6
)
A
w
in
s
(%
):
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
10
0
10
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
80
.4
9
(4
.4
3)
73
.1
7
(4
.9
5
)
6
5
.8
5
(5
.3
)
4
8
.7
8
(5
.5
8
)
0
(0
)
7
5
.6
1
(4
.8
)
4
8
.7
8
(5
.5
8
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
92
.5
(2
.9
8)
75
(4
.9
)
9
0
(3
.3
9
)
7
7
.5
(4
.7
2
)
4
7
.5
(5
.6
5
)
8
5
(4
.0
4
)
7
7
.5
(4
.7
2
)
T
o
ta
l
br
ib
es
p
ro
po
se
d
by
A
:
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
25
12
8
1
0
9
2
3
8
0
3
2
1
4
2
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
69
.2
7
(6
.0
7)
14
8.
68
(6
.6
9
)
1
2
6
.4
6
(6
.2
4
)
1
4
1
.4
1
(1
3
.5
8
)
1
7
.8
(5
.4
6
)
6
9
.9
8
(8
.1
6
)
1
3
7
.7
6
(8
.8
7
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
98
.8
(9
.6
4)
13
7.
68
(8
.2
1
)
1
1
8
.5
8
(8
.2
5
)
1
6
2
.0
5
(8
.0
1
)
1
2
2
.0
8
(1
0
.6
1
)
1
1
1
.3
(8
.2
1
)
1
1
7
.2
3
(9
.4
8
)
W
in
n
in
g
co
a
li
ti
o
n
si
ze
if
A
w
in
s:
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
7
4
7
6
4
6
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
5.
82
(0
.1
6)
5.
13
(0
.1
6
)
6
.5
6
(0
.1
2
)
6
.1
5
(0
.1
8
)
X
X
4
.7
7
(0
.1
6
)
6
.0
5
(0
.2
1
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
5.
76
(0
.1
5)
5.
07
(0
.1
3
)
5
.4
7
(0
.1
4
)
4
.9
4
(0
.1
3
)
4
.7
9
(0
.1
5
)
5
.0
6
(0
.1
4
)
5
.1
(0
.1
5
)
W
in
n
in
g
co
a
li
ti
o
n
si
ze
if
B
w
in
s:
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
7
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
4.
38
(0
.2
5)
4.
09
(0
.0
6
)
4
(0
)
6
.1
4
(0
.2
1
)
6
.6
3
(0
.1
1
)
4
.1
(0
.0
7
)
4
(0
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
6.
33
(0
.4
)
5.
3
(0
.2
7
)
5
.2
5
(0
.4
)
5
.1
1
(0
.2
9
)
5
.8
6
(0
.1
9
)
4
.5
(0
.2
3
)
4
.1
1
(0
.0
8
)
L
ev
el
li
n
g
by
A
(%
):
E
q
u
il
ib
ri
u
m
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
10
0
10
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
90
(4
.8
4)
85
.3
7
(5
.6
3
)
8
2
.9
3
(5
.9
9
)
9
2
.3
1
(5
.3
3
)
6
0
(2
2
.3
4
)
2
9
.7
3
(7
.6
6
)
3
2
.5
(7
.5
5
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
30
(7
.3
7)
46
.1
5
(8
.1
2
1
)
3
5
(7
.6
7
)
4
6
.1
5
(8
.1
2
1
)
5
2
.9
4
(8
.7
1
)
0
(0
)
7
.5
(4
.2
4
)
Q
u
a
si
-l
ev
el
in
g
by
A
(%
):
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
se
q
u
en
ti
al
95
(3
.5
2)
90
.2
4
(4
.7
3
)
9
2
.6
8
(4
.1
5
)
9
6
.1
5
(3
.8
5
)
8
0
(1
8
.2
6
)
3
4
.6
2
(9
.5
2
)
5
2
.5
(8
.0
6
)
O
b
se
rv
ed
:
si
m
u
lt
an
eo
u
s
50
(8
.0
5)
79
.4
9
(6
.5
8
)
4
7
.5
(8
.0
4
)
5
6
.4
1
(8
.0
8
)
5
8
.8
2
(8
.5
9
)
1
6
.2
2
(6
.1
7
)
2
7
.5
(7
.1
9
)
N
o
te
s:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
su
b
je
ct
le
ve
l.
L
o
b
b
y
A
n
ev
er
w
in
s
in
th
e
se
q
u
en
ti
a
l
se
t-
u
p
in
sc
en
a
ri
o
5
.
T
h
er
ef
o
re
,
w
e
h
av
e
n
o
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
w
in
n
in
g
co
al
it
io
n
si
ze
s
fo
r
th
is
sc
en
ar
io
(a
s
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
th
e
“
X
”
).
L
ev
el
li
n
g
a
n
d
Q
u
a
si
-l
ev
el
in
g
re
fe
r
to
th
e
st
ra
te
g
y
ty
p
es
a
s
d
efi
n
ed
in
3
.1
.2
.
20
3.1.2 Leveling, Flooding and Mixing
We now turn to the predictions of leveling and flooding. In theory, all members of a coalition
should be equally expensive to buy back for lobby B. With our discretization of the bribes and
initial valuations with half points, it is sufficient to bring them to almost the same level so
that the legislators’ valuations differ by maximally one point in scenarios with supermajorities
because it costs B a full point to turn a valuation of 0.5 into -0.5. We thus consider a bribe offer
schedule as leveling if the valuation of all members of a coalition differ by at most one point. In
scenarios 1 to 5 we compute the relative frequency of bribe schedules, in which more than one
bribe is offered. For scenarios 6 and 7, we also consider bribe schedules in which only one bribe
is offered as the legislators with positive ex-ante valuation are also coalition members whose
valuations can be compared to that of the bribed. In addition to leveling as just described,
we also report “quasi-leveling” bribe profiles, in which the valuations (after the bribe offers) of
legislators must not be different by more than 5 points.
Sequential Moves In scenarios 1-4, where the model predicts 100% leveling, we indeed
observe high percentages of leveling (Table 1). However, in scenarios 6 and 7 where the theory
also predicts full leveling, we observe leveling only in around 30% of all cases. This suggests
that leveling may not entirely originate from subjects realizing that it is optimal to leave no
soft spot but perhaps rather from the fact that it is very easy to offer the same amount to
every legislator. The number almost doubles when the more lenient criterion of quasi-leveling
is applied but only for scenario 7. Flooding is predicted for scenario 7, and we see in Figure
2 that most lobbies A indeed offer bribes to more than one legislator. The mode is on 1 for
scenario 6 where it is indeed optimal to only bribe one additional legislator.
Simultaneous Moves Leveling occurs much less frequently in the simultaneous case. How-
ever, in scenarios 1-5 it is still a popular strategy. As a consequence of the lower degree of
leveling, the standard deviation in bribes is much (and strongly significantly) higher in the
simultaneous moves case (5 compared to 1.5 points).
For the reasons outlined in section 2, we do not have exact predictions for the behavior in this
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treatment. However, we know that there are no pure strategy equilibria and that it cannot be
optimal to treat legislators differently in scenarios 1-5. As a consequence, the distributions of the
amounts of bribes that the seven legislators receive in these scenarios should look very similar
for each legislator. However, the box plots in Figure 5 (Appendix) indicate that legislators 3, 4
and 5 receive bribes more often than legislators 1, 2, 6 and 7. This indicates that subjects do
not mix optimally.
3.2 Three Legislators
Number and Level of Bribes First, recall the differences in the theoretical predictions
between the sequential and the simultaneous case. The comparative statics predictions go in
the same direction. However, the predicted differences in the number of bribes is smaller in
the simultaneous moves case where the prediction is that A always offers bribes to only two
legislators in scenario 2, as in the sequential case, but also with 75% probability in scenario 1
and only with 25% to all three legislators. For scenario 2, A is predicted to always make offers
to all three legislators in the sequential moves case. The predicted pattern is well reflected in
the data (Figure 3 and Table 8, Appendix A). The mode is correct in all four situations and
the comparative statics all hold. However, the point predictions regarding the average number
of bribes are again not accurate. The same holds for the total sum of bribes offered (Table 5
and Table 9, Appendix A).
We observe again that lobby A wins more often in the simultaneous moves case, which goes
against the theoretical predictions.12
Leveling Leveling is very prevalent in both sub-treatments and both scenarios and at least
86% of the lobbies A play a leveling strategy. The distributions of bribes for each legislator
shows that the legislators in the middle are bribed much more frequently in the simultaneous
moves case, which again suggests suboptimal mixing (Figure 6, Appendix A).
12The difference is only significant when the two scenarios are pooled.
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Figure 3: Number of Bribes
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Notes: The upper panel shows the means, their 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered at the subject level and the theoretical point predictions (as diamonds). The lower panel
displays the observed and theoretically predicted (in red) distributions.
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Table 5: Results 3 legislators
Sc1 se Sc2 se
Bribes proposed by A:
Equilibrium: sequential 3 2
Observed: sequential 2.66 (0.04) 2.07 (0.05)
Equilibrium: simultaneous 2.25 2
Observed: simultaneous 2.41 (0.04) 2.16 (0.06)
Votes won by A:
Observed: sequential 2.35 (0.06) 1.77 (0.07)
Observed: simultaneous 2.27 (0.06) 1.84 (0.07)
A wins (%):
Equilibrium: sequential 100 100
Observed: sequential 83.17 (3.12) 73.68 (3.97)
Equilibrium: simultaneous <100 <100
Observed: simultaneous 92.86 (2.53) 79.59 (3.91)
Total bribes proposed by A:
Equilibrium: sequential 5 14
Observed: sequential 6.54 (0.25) 11.92 (0.44)
Equilibrium: simultaneous 2.25 11
Observed: simultaneous 6.66 (0.33) 11.66 (0.44)
Winning coalition size if A wins:
Observed: sequential 2.64 (0.04) 2.14 (0.04)
Observed: simultaneous 2.38 (0.04) 2.18 (0.04)
Winning coalition size if B wins:
Observed: sequential 2.12 (0.05) 2.28 (0.07)
Observed: simultaneous 2.29 (0.1) 2.5 (0.1)
Levelling by A (%):
Equilibrium: sequential 100 100
Observed: sequential 86.14 (4.76) 95.6 (2.64)
Equilibrium: simultaneous 100 0-100
Observed: simultaneous 88.78 (4.25) 87.37 (4.01)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. The theoretical
predictions for the simultaneous case are expected values.
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4 Conclusions
We set out to test the key predictions of the seminal vote-buying model by Groseclose and
Snyder (1996). We design nine different scenarios, varying the number of legislators (3 and 7)
between sessions, and the relative willingness to pay of the lobbies and the preference biases of
the legislators within sessions in what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first experimental
study of this model. A key feature of our experiment is that we run treatments with the
sequential moves structure as assumed in the original model as well as treatments in which
this assumption is relaxed and subjects move simultaneously instead. We argue, and show
theoretically for the 3 legislator scenarios, that the key comparative statics predictions of the
GS model carry over to the simultaneous moves case.
In the experiment, we find for the sequential moves set-up that the key predictions are
indeed borne out by the data. The main insights on how the majority size depends on the
relative willingness to pay of the lobbies and on the biases of the legislators are all confirmed.
More specific predictions on the exact number and level of bribes are less accurate. Turning to
the simultaneous set-up, we find that the main comparative statics predictions still hold but
that behavior varies much more and the predictive power from the sequential moves model is
reduced. Overall, this suggests that the GS model captures some important insights that are
even robust to the relaxation of the central modeling assumption of sequential moves but that
its predictive power is limited with respect to more specific point predictions of the model.
In stress-testing a seminal model by relaxing a central model assumption our paper shares
similarities with the work of Tremewan and Vanberg (2016) who study legislative bargaining
in an arguably more realistic but not theoretically (analytically) solvable set-up than that in
the established bargaining models. We see this approach, which is much less often followed
than simply implementing 1-to-1 a game theoretic model, as a useful complement. It allows
for new insights into how strongly predictions depend on certain modeling assumptions, which
might not hold in the field, and thus speaks to external validity concerns regarding a model’s
predictions. We believe that more studies in this spirit would be highly valuable.
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A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 6: Number of Bribes - 7 Legislators
1-5 seq 1-5 sim 6-7 seq 6-7 sim All seq All sim
GS prediction 0.67*** 0.19*** 0.53*** 0.03 0.62*** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
cons 1.01*** 4.27*** 1.96*** 4.57*** 1.37*** 4.33***
(0.27) (0.31) (0.35) (0.31) (0.22) (0.24)
N 205 200 82 80 287 280
R2 0.42 0.10 0.35 0.00 0.40 0.07
N clust 80 77 62 58 80 80
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the subject level. The first two column refer to scenarios 1-5, the third and
fourth to scenarios 6-7 and the last two to all scenarios combined.
Table 7: Sum of offered Bribes - 7 Legislators
1-5 seq 1-5 sim 6-7 seq 6-7 sim All seq All sim
GS prediction 0.51*** 0.17*** 0.89*** 0.03 0.56*** 0.16***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05)
cons 60.85*** 130.02*** 43.60*** 124.67*** 60.82*** 126.26***
(8.25) (9.77) (13.69) (14.25) (7.98) (8.78)
N 205 200 82 80 287 280
R2 0.21 0.03 0.35 0.00 0.23 0.02
N clust 80 77 62 58 80 80
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
subject level. The first two column refer to scenarios 1-5, the third and fourth to scenarios 6-7
and the last two to all scenarios combined.
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Table 8: Number of Bribes - 3 Legislators
seq sim sim
GS prediction 0.58*** (0.09) 0.19** (0.07)
sim eq prediction 0.77** (0.30)
cons 0.92*** (0.22) 1.76*** (0.21) 0.61 (0.65)
N 280 280 280
R2 0.21 0.03 0.03
N clust 56 56 56
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the subject level. “sim eq prediction” refers to the expected value of
the theoretically predicted mixed strategy equilibria.
Table 9: Sum of (offered) Bribes - 3 Legislators
seq sim sim
GS prediction 0.85*** (0.06) 0.81*** (0.09)
sim eq prediction 0.74*** (0.08)
cons 1.67*** (0.61) 1.73* (0.88) 4.93*** (0.55)
N 280 280 280
R2 0.49 0.43 0.43
N clust 56 56 56
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the subject level. “sim eq prediction” refers to the expected value of
the theoretically predicted mixed strategy equilibria.
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Figure 4: Bribes to the 7 Legislators in Scenarios 1-5
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Figure 5: Bribes to the 7 Legislators in Scenarios 6 and 7
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Figure 6: Bribes to the 3 Legislators
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B Experimental Instructions
[Below are the instructions for the 7 legislator sequential moves treatment. Instructions for the
other treatments were very similar and are therefore omitted here. They can be obtained from
the authors upon request as well as the original instructions in German.]
Overview Welcome to this experiment. We ask you not to speak with other participants during the exper-
iment and to switch off your mobile phones and other mobile electronic devices.
For your participation in today’s session, you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount
of the payout depends in part on your decisions and partly on the decisions of other participants. It is therefore
important that you carefully read and understand the instructions before the start of the experiment.
In this experiment, every interaction between participants goes through the computers you are sitting in
front of. You will interact with each other anonymously and your decisions will only be saved along with your
random ID number. Neither your name nor the names of other participants will be made public, neither today
nor in future written evaluations.
Today’s session includes several rounds. Your payout amount is the sum of the earned points in all rounds,
converted into Swiss francs, plus your participation fee of CHF 5. The conversion of points into Swiss francs is
done as follows. Each point is worth 2 cents, so the following applies: 50 points = CHF 1.00.
Each participant will be paid privately at the disbursement desk, so that other participants will not be able
to see how much they have earned.
Experiment This experiment consists of 7 structurally identical rounds.
The group of two Participants are randomly divided into groups of two members each. Each round, these
groups are re-formed at random. All decisions within a round and a group of two affect only the members of
the group of two and have no influence on other groups.
It remains anonymous with whom you are in a group, that is neither you nor the other member learns the
identity of the other member during or after the experiment.
Two group members, a committee and two alternatives In each group of two, there is a member Ma
and a member Mb. Chance decides every round anew who is Ma and who is Mb, so you will most likely be Ma
in some rounds and in other rounds Mb.
In addition to Ma and Mb, there is a committee in each round and for each group, which consists of
7 committee members. The committee members are automated, that is they are played by computers and
not by other participants. The individual committee members are labeled with the labels K1-K7 and thus
distinguishable from each other.
The committee decides by vote on one of two alternatives, A or B. A simple majority of votes for an
alternative is enough for it to be selected. That is, if alternative A receives 4, 5, 6, or 7 votes from the 7
committee members, then alternative A wins and B loses; with 4, 5, 6 or 7 votes for alternative B, alternative
B wins.
Your payout depends on this decision of the committee. If you are a group member Ma, you prefer alternative
A and the other group member (Mb) prefers alternative B. If you are a group member Mb, you prefer alternative
B and the other group member (Ma) prefers alternative A.
The committee members automatically receive a certain number of points from the computer each time
they vote for A or B. Below we denote by Va the number of points a committee member gets more if it votes for
A than for B. If it gets more points for a vote for B, Va is negative. The Va values of the committee members
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are numbered according to their labels, so we refer to the Va value of member K2 as Va2. For example, if a
committee member K4 receives 3 points more for a vote for A than for a vote for B, then Va4 = 3. For example,
if a committee member K2 receives 4 points more for a vote for B than for a vote for A, then Va2 = -4.
Before the committee vote, you can try to convince committee members to vote for your preferred alternative.
You can make offers to any number of committee members. An offer includes a number of points that you pay
to the committee member if it votes for your preferred alternative.
Budgets and offers Group member Ma receives a budget of 400 points at the beginning of the round. Group
member Mb receives a budget of 200 points at the beginning of the round.
If Ma’s preferred alternative wins the vote in the committee, that is alternative A, Ma gets a number of
points Xa, while Mb receives no extra points. If Mb’s preferred alternative wins the vote on the committee,
that is alternative B, Mb receives a number of points Xb, while Ma receives no additional points. Xa is 300
points in each round, while Xb can be different in different rounds. Both members learn the value of Xb at the
beginning of the round.
Ma and Mb may offer committee members a number of points, Pa and Pb respectively, to vote for their
preferred alternative. These offers are binding, ie if, for example, committee member K3 is offered by Ma Pa3
= 5 points to vote for A, and actually votes for A, 5 points will be transferred from Mas Budget to K3. Should
K3 vote for B despite Ma’s offer, K3 will not receive points from Ma.
Ma and Mb can each submit offers to any number of the 7 committee members. It should be noted that in
total no more points can be offered than the budget includes. It should also be noted that only integer scores
can be offered.
Ma makes his offers first. Mb then learns the offers of Ma and makes his offers, after which the committee
decides.
The decision of the committee members The individual committee members decide according to the
following decision rule:
V a+ Pa− Pb > 0: vote for A
V a+ Pa− Pb < 0: vote for B
This means that a committee member always votes for an alternative if it receives more points from this
decision than from the decision for the other alternative.
The result for member Mb is as follows: If Mb wants to induce a committee member, e.g. K4, to move to
vote for B, his offer must be at least as high as the sum of the offer of Ma and Va, that is, in the example, his
offer must meet the following condition: Pb4 > V a4 + Pa4.
Example: Committee member K3 automatically receives 3.5 points more from the computer when voting
for Alternative B, that is Va3 = -3.5. Ma offers 8 points if K3 votes for A, that is Pa3 = 8, and Mb offers 5
points, that is Pb3 = 5. In this case, K3 will decide on B because: V a3 + Pa3− Pb3 = −0.5 < 0.
Sequence of a round At the beginning of a round, the first screen tells you whether you are Ma or Mb, and
thus whether your budget is 400 or 200 points. In addition, you will see the number of points Xa and Xb that
Ma or Mb receive if their preferred alternative, A or B, is selected by the committee (where Xa is 300 points in
each round).
Then Ma first takes action and can submit offers Pa1-Pa7 to any number of committee members in the
following input mask [omitted here]. As you can see, Ma finds the Va values of each committee member on the
same screen (example values).
If Ma leaves a field blank, this is interpreted as an offer of Pa = 0 points to the appropriate committee
member. After Ma has submitted his offers, Mb is on the train. Mb can now also submit offers to any number
of committee members. This is done via the following input mask [omitted here], on which Mb can see the Va
values of the individual committee members, as well as the offers of Ma to the individual committee members
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(example values).
If Mb releases a field, this is interpreted as an offer of Pb = 0 points to the corresponding committee
member.
After Mb has made his offers, the committee members decide on the decision rule above for A or B. The
decision of the committee falls for the alternative, which receives more votes.
Payment in each round (in points) Group member Ma receives the following payout in a round: the
budget (400) plus Xa (300) when his preferred alternative A is selected by the committee, minus Ma’s offers to
committee members who actually voted for A.
Group member Mb receives the following payouts in a round: the budget (200) plus Xb if his preferred
Alternative B is selected by the committee, minus Mb’s offers to committee members who actually voted for B.
Example 1: Ma made offers Pa1, Pa4, Pa5 and Pa7, Mb has made offers Pb1, Pb2 and Pb6 and committee
members K1, K2, K3 and K7 voted for A, while K4, K5 and K6 voted for B, thus Alternative A was selected
by the committee. In this case, the following round payments result in points:
Points Ma = 400 +Xa− Pa1− Pa7
Points Mb = 200− Pb6
Example 2: Ma made offers Pa2, Pa4, Pa5 and Pa7, Mb made offers Pb1, Pb2 and Pb6 and committee
members K2, K3 and K7 voted for A, while K1, K4, K5 and K6 voted for B, thus Alternative B was selected
by the committee. In this case, the following round payments result in points:
Points Ma = 400Pa2− Pa7
Points Mb = 200 +Xb− Pb1− Pb6
Payment at the end (in CHF) At the end of the experiment, the earned income is converted into Swiss
francs and together with your participation fee of CHF 5 privately paid.
Practice rounds and quiz Before the 7 rounds of the experiment, there will be a short quiz on the screen
as well as 3 practice rounds, which only serve your understanding, but are not payout relevant. The practice
rounds and the quiz are designed to ensure that all participants have fully understood the instructions.
Questions? Take your time to review the instructions. If you have questions, please raise your hand. An
experimenter will then come to your cubicle.
Important Terms
Ma Member who prefers Alternative A and can make offers first. Ma has a budget of 400.
Mb Member who prefers Alternative B and can make offers second. Mb has a budget of 200.
Xa Number of points for Ma should Alternative A win. It applies in each round Xa = 300.
Xb Number of points for Mb should Alternative B win. Xb can be different from round to
round.
K1-K7 Committee members 1-7.
Va1-Va7 Number of points a committee member with the corresponding number will automatically
receive if it votes for Alternative A instead of Alternative B. If this value is negative,
the amount indicates the number of points that the committee member receives less if it
votes for alternative A instead of alternative B.
Pa1-Pa7 Ma’s offer to the committee member with the appropriate number to vote for Alternative
A. Ma only has to pay this amount to the committee member if it actually votes for
alternative A.
Pb1-Pb7 Mb’s offer to the committee member with the appropriate number to vote for Alternative
B. Mb only has to pay this amount to the committee member if it actually votes for
alternative B.
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